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In practical quantum key distribution system, the state preparation and measurement have state-
dependent imperfections comparing with the ideal BB84 protocol. If the state-dependent imper-
fection can not be regarded as an unitary transformation, it should not be considered as part of
quantum channel noise introduced by the eavesdropper, the commonly used secret key rate formula
GLLP can not be applied correspondingly. In this paper, the unconditional security of quantum
key distribution with state-dependent imperfections will be analyzed by estimating upper bound of
the phase error rate in the quantum channel and the imperfect measurement. Interestingly, since
Eve can not control all phase error in the quantum key distribution system, the final secret key rate
under constant quantum bit error rate can be improved comparing with the perfect quantum key
distribution protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the art of sharing secret keys between the transmitter Alice and receiver
Bob. It has unconditional security, even if unlimited computational power and storage capacity are controlled by the
eavesdropper Eve. Since the QKD protocol has been proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], the unconditional
security attracts a lot of attentions both in theory and experimental sides [2]. Theoretical physicists have analyzed
unconditional security of QKD in many respects. Initially, Lo and Chau [3] proposed the security analysis with the
help of quantum computer. Then, Shor and Preskill [4] proved security of prepare-and-measure protocol is equival to
entanglement-based protocol, thus unconditional security of QKD has been proved combining with the CSS code and
entanglement distillation and purification (EDP) technology. Without applying the EDP technology, Renner [5] has
analyzed security of QKD with information theory method. More recently, Horodecki et al. [6] have analyzed security
of QKD based on Private-entanglement states. Inspired by Horodecki’s mind, Renes and Smith [7] have analyzed
noisy processing allows some phase errors to be left uncorrected without compromising unconditional security of
the key. However, all of the security analysis are based on perfect states preparation and measurement. The first
unconditional security of QKD based on imperfect devices was proposed by Gottesman, Lo, Lukenhaus, and Preskill
[8] (GLLP formula), they proved that only the single photon state transmitted in the quantum channel can be used
to generate the final secret key. Applying the GLLP formula and decoy state method [9], security of the decoy state
QKD has been analyzed by Lo [10] and Wang [11] respectively. Correspondingly, the secret key transmission distance
can be improved greatly with decoy state method [12, 13]. More recently, Berta et al. [14, 15] have given a method
for proving Bob’s device independent QKD protocol by using the uncertainty relation, which is related to the earlier
work by Koashi [16], but it also requires that the state preparation in Alice’s side should be well characterized.
Obviously, if the imperfection is basis-dependent, we can consider a slightly changed protocol, where the state
preparation and measurement are perfect, while there is an virtual unitary transformation controlled by Eve introduces
the basis-dependent imperfection in the quantum channel. Since security of the original protocol is no less than the
slightly changed protocol, the final secret key rate can be estimated utilizing the GLLP formula. However, most of
the imperfection in states preparation and measurement are state-dependent [17, 18], which can not be controlled by
Eve in the security analysis. For instance, the wave plate may be inaccurate in polarization based QKD system, while
the phase modulator may be modulated by inaccurate voltage in phase-coding QKD system. If the imperfection can
not be illustrated as an unitary transformation, it can no be considered as part of the quantum channel controlled by
Eve.
In this paper, security of practical QKD system with state-dependent imperfections will be analyzed by considering
imperfect states preparation in Alice’s side and imperfect states measurement in Bob’s side respectively. We apply
the EDP technology by considering the most general imperfection, and a much better secret key rate under constant
imperfect parameters has been analyzed in comparation with previous works. Comparing with the security analysis
given by Marøy et al. [17] and Lydersen et al. [18], we apply a much simpler method and get a much higher
secret key rate. We consider that states prepared by Alice and measured by Bob both have individual imperfections.
The whole security analysis can be divided into two steps based on an virtual protocol. Firstly, we consider that
Alice prepares perfect entangled quantum state pairs, and she keeps half of the perfect entangled quantum state,
sends half of the imperfect modulated quantum state to Bob, which illustrate the imperfect states preparation.
2Meanwhile, Bob applies perfect Hadamard transformation in the receiver’s side, thus Alice and Bob can share the
maximally entangled quantum state utilizing the EDP technology. Secondly, Alice applies perfect measurement with
her maximally entangled quantum states, and Bob applies imperfect measurement with his entangled quantum states
correspondingly, finally they can establish the raw key. Similar to Shor and Preskill’s [4] security analysis, security
of the practical QKD is equal to the virtual protocol with the EDP technology and imperfect measurement. Since
the phase error introduced by Bob’s imperfect measurement should not be controlled by Eve, we can get a much
higher secret key rate correspondingly. The similar result has also been given by Renner et al. [19–21], they proved
that adding noise in the classical post processing can improve the secret key rate by considering that phase errors
introduced in the post processing can not be controlled by the eavesdropper Eve [7]. Comparing with the security
analysis given by Renner et al., the noise introduced by the imperfect device are precisely known by Eve, since the
random encoding choice, the imperfection can not be corrected or controlled by Eve. Thus, the exactly known but can
not be controlled imperfection is similar to adding noise as the security analysis model given by Kraus et al. [19, 20].
SECURITY OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION WITH PERFECT STATES PREPARATION AND
MEASUREMENT
Before introducing the method to analyze security of QKD with imperfect devices, security of QKD with perfect
devices will be analyzed in this section. Suppose that Alice and Bob choose the polarization encoding QKD system
in our security analysis, the standard prepare-and-measure QKD protocol will be introduced in the following section.
In Alice’s side, the classical bit 0 is randomly encoded by quantum states |0o〉 or |45o〉, the classical bit 1 is randomly
encoded by quantum states |90o〉 or | − 45o〉. In Bob’s side, he randomly choose rectilinear basis {|0o〉, |90o〉} or
diagonal basis {|45o〉, | − 45o〉} to measure the quantum state transmitted through the quantum channel. After Bob’s
perfect measurement and some classical steps of QKD (sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy
amplification), secret key bits can be shared between Alice and Bob.
Following the technique obtained by Shor and Preskill [4], security of prepare-and-measure QKD protocol is equal
to security of entanglement-based QKD protocol, which can be constructed by considering the corresponding prepare-
and-measure encoding scheme as shown in Fig.1.
FIG. 1: Entanglement-based protocol with Pauli channel and eavesdropper Eve. Z is Eve’s phase error operation, X is Eve’s
bit error operation. A1 is part of Alice’s system, B1 is part of Bob’s system.
Alice prepares maximally entangled pairs |φ1〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB). After applying the Hadamard operation
randomly to the second part of the pair, she sends Bob half of the pair. Bob acknowledges the reception of his state
and applies the Hadamard operation randomly. In the security analysis, the most generally noisy channels we need
to consider are Pauli channels. By considering Eve’s eavesdropping in the Pauli channel, the quantum state about
Alice, Bob and Eve is given by
∑
u,v,i,j
√
PuvQij(IA
⊗
HiB1X
u
E1
ZvE2H
j
A1
|φ1〉|u〉E1 |v〉E2 |i〉B1 |j〉A1), (1)
3where H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
is the perfect Hadamard operator, which means the transformation between different bases
in practical QKD system.
(
0 1
1 0
)
is the X operator, which means the bit error introduced by Eve.
(
1 0
0 −1
)
is
the Z operator, which means the phase error introduced by Eve. Correspondingly, XZ means the bit phase error
introduced by Eve in the quantum channel. Puv, u, v ∈ {0, 1} means the probability of the X
uZv operator introduced
by Eve, which should be normalized by the following equation
∑
u,v
Puv = 1. (2)
Qij , i, j ∈ {0, 1}means the probability of H
i and Hj matrix introduced by Alice and Bob respectively, which satisfies
Qij =
1
4 for Alice and Bob’s randomly choice.
After the sifting step, the case of i 6= j will be discarded. We trace out A1, B1 and Eve’s systems to get the
following equation
ρAB =
∑
u,v
Puv(
1
2IA
⊗
XuE1Z
v
E2
|φ1〉〈φ1|Z
v
E2
XuE1
⊗
IA
+ 12IA
⊗
HB1X
u
E1
ZvE2HA1 |φ1〉〈φ1|HA1Z
v
E2
XuE1HB1)
⊗
IA.
(3)
There are bit errors and phase errors in the Pauli channel, all of errors are considered to be introduced by Eve
in the security analysis. After transmitting through the quantum channel, the initially shared maximally entangled
state can be transformed into Bell states as the following equation
|φ1〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB),
|φ2〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉AB + |10〉AB),
|φ3〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉AB − |11〉AB),
|φ4〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉AB − |10〉AB).
(4)
If the maximally entangled pairs |pi1〉 is transformed into Bell state |φ1〉, there is no error can be introduced in the
quantum channel. However, if the maximally entangled pairs |φ1〉 is transformed into Bell states |φ2〉, |φ3〉 and |φ4〉
respectively, the bit error, phase error and bit phase error will be introduced by Eve correspondingly. Thus, the bit
error rate and phase error rate can be given by
ebit = 〈φ2|ρAB|φ2〉+ 〈φ4|ρAB|φ4〉,
ephase = 〈φ3|ρAB|φ3〉+ 〈φ4|ρAB|φ4〉.
(5)
The bit error rate and phase error rate should be calculated when we analyze unconditional security of QKD. In
practical QKD system, quantum bit error rate can be estimated after the parameter estimation step in the classical
part of QKD protocol. The main difficulty in security analysis is how to estimate upper bound of the phase error
rate.
Combining equations (3), (4) with (5), the phase error rate minus the bit error rate is
ephase − ebit = 〈φ2|ρAB|φ2〉 − 〈φ3|ρAB|φ3〉 = 0. (6)
Thus, the phase error can be estimated by the bit error rate accurately in the perfect device case. Correspondingly,
the final secret key rate can be given by
R = 1− h(ephase)− h(ebit) = 1− 2h(ebit). (7)
where, h is the binary entropy function. The maximal tolerated bit error rate in the quantum channel is 0.11 with
equation (7), which has also been given by Shor and Preskill.
4SECURITY OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION WITH STATE-DEPENDENT IMPERFECTIONS
Since practical QKD devices always have some flaws, the photon state preparation and measurement are always
imperfect in practical QKD realizations. In the most general case, the imperfection is state-dependent. For example,
the deflection angle has slight differences between different wave plates in polarization based QKD system. Similar to
the security analysis of QKD with perfect devices, we will give the security analysis of QKD with imperfect devices in
this section by utilizing the EDP technology and imperfect measurement. We firstly give the model description about
the imperfect states preparation and measurement, then we will prove that the imperfect measurement is equal to
the perfect measurement adding the noisy processing in our security analysis, finally security of the virtual protocol
will be analyzed combining with the imperfect measurement and EDP technology.
Device-independent imperfections description
Angular deviation of the practical device can be used for illustrating the state-dependent imperfection. In Alice’s
side, the classical bit 0 is randomly encoded by quantum states |α1
o〉 or |45+α2
o〉, while the classical bit 1 is randomly
encoded by quantum states |90+α3
o〉 or |−45+α4
o〉, where α1, α2, α3 and α4 are security parameters for illustrating
Alice’s angular deviations. In Bob’s side, he randomly choose the imperfect rectilinear basis {|β1
o〉, |90 + β3
o〉} or
the imperfect diagonal basis {|45 + β2
o〉, | − 45 + β4
o〉} to measure the quantum state transmitted in the quantum
channel, where β1, β2, β3 and β4 are security parameters for illustrating Bob’s angular deviation. Since the random
encoding and decoding choice, all of the imperfection can not be controlled or corrected by the eavesdropper, detailed
illustration of the imperfect parameter can be given as in Fig. 2.
FIG. 2: The most general imperfect states preparation and measurement in practical QKD experimental realization, where α1,
α2, α3 and α4 illustrates the imperfect states preparation, β1, β2, β3 and β4 illustrates the imperfect measurement.
If the security parameter can be satisfied with α1 = α3, α2 = α4, β1 = β3 and β2 = β4, it will be the basis-dependent
imperfection correspondingly.
Imperfect measurement
In practical QKD system with imperfect devices as illustrated in the previous subsection, Bob gets the classical
bit 0 with the projective measurement operator |β1
o〉〈β1
o| and |45 + β2
o〉〈45 + β2
o|, gets the classical bit 1 with the
projective measurement |90+ β3
o〉〈90+ β3
o| and | − 45+ β4
o〉〈−45+ β4
o| respectively. Since the rectilinear basis and
diagonal basis will be selected randomly, the quantum bit error rate introduced by the imperfect measurement can
5be given by
ebit1
= 12 [
1
2 (
〈90+β3o|0o〉〈0o|90+β3o〉
〈90+β3o|0o〉〈0o|90+β3o〉+〈β1o|0o〉〈0o|β1o〉 +
〈β1o|90o〉〈90o|β1o〉
〈β1o|90o〉〈90o|β1o〉+〈90+β3o|90o〉〈90o|90+β3o〉 )+
1
2 (
〈−45+β4o|45o〉〈45o|−45+β4o〉
〈−45+β4o|45o〉〈45o|−45+β4o〉+〈45+β2o|45o〉〈45o|45+β2o〉
+ 〈45+β2
o|−45o〉〈−45o|45+β2o〉
〈45+β2o|−45o〉〈−45o|45+β2o〉+〈−45+β4o|−45o〉〈−45o|−45+β4o〉 )]
= 12 [
1
2 (
sin2β1
sin2β1+cos2β3
+ sin
2β3
sin2β3+cos2β1
) + 12 (
sin2β2
sin2β2+cos2β4
+ sin
2β4
sin2β4+cos2β2
)].
(8)
From this calculation, we can get the result that the imperfect measurement will introduce bit flipping with the
probability ebit1. Comparing with the imperfect measurement, the perfect measurement will introduce the bit flipping
with zero probability. In our security analysis, Alice and Bob should establish the maximally entangled pairs before
applying the measurement, which means that the eavesdropper can only get the error bit information about the secret
key through the imperfect measurement in Bob’s side. Thus, we can simplify the imperfect measurement as the
perfect measurement adding a noisy processing protocol, where the bit 0(1) will be transformed into 1(0) with the
probability ebit1.
Virtual EDP protocol
We propose the virtual protocol based on the EDP technology as in Fig. 3.
FIG. 3: Entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol with imperfect devices. We introduce the third party A1, B1
in the new protocol, which can not be controlled by Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. In the first step, Alice and Bob share the
maximally entangled pairs. In the second step, Alice applies the perfect measurement, Bob applies the perfect measurement
and a noisy processing protocol to get the raw key.
The new protocol mainly contain two steps: the first step is considering the maximally entangled state |φ1〉 to
be shared between Alice and Bob. In the rectilinear basis case, the classical bit 0 is prepared by the quantum state
cos(α1)|0
o〉+sin(α1)|1
o〉, while the classical bit 1 is prepared by the quantum state −sin(α3)|0
o〉+cos(α3)|1
o〉. In the
diagonal basis, the classical bit 0 is prepared by the quantum state cos(α2+
pi
4 )|0
o〉+sin(α2+
pi
4 )|1
o〉, while the classical
bit 1 is prepared by the quantum state cos(α4−
pi
4 )|0
o〉+sin(α4−
pi
4 )|1
o〉. For simplicity, the state preparation can also be
illustrated as the following case, Alice prepares the quantum state 1√
2
(|0o〉IA1 |0
o〉+|1o〉IA1 |1
o〉)|e0〉+
1√
2
(|0o〉HA1 |0
o〉+
|1o〉HA1 |1
o〉)|e1〉 and transmits half of the perfect state to Bob, where HA1 =
(
cos(α2 +
pi
4 ) cos(α4 −
pi
4 )
sin(α2 +
pi
4 ) sin(α4 −
pi
4 )
)
, IA1 =(
cos(α1) −sin(α3)
sin(α1) cos(α3)
)
, |e0〉 and |e1〉 are Alice’s auxiliary quantum states. If Alice want to transmit the state |0
o〉
to Bob, the auxiliary quantum state |e0〉 will be selected, and the practical quantum state IA1 |0
o〉 = cos(α1)|0
o〉 +
sin(α1)|1
o〉 will be transmitted in the quantum channel. Since all of the imperfect state can be analyzed similarly, the
non-unitary matrix HA1 and IA1 can be used for illustrating the imperfect state preparation. In the receiver’s side,
Bob applies the unitary transformation HB1 or IB1 randomly, where HB1 =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
is the perfect Hadamard
transformation, IB1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
is the perfect identity transformation. Since Alice and Bob can apply the EDP
technology, they will share the maximally entangled quantum pairs before the imperfect measurement.
The second step is applying the perfect and imperfect measurement in Alice’s side and Bob’s side respectively.
More precisely, Alice measure the entangled quantum state with perfect rectilinear basis {0o〉, |90o〉} or diagonal basis
6{45o〉, | − 45o〉}. Bob measure the entangled quantum state with the imperfect rectilinear basis {|β1
o〉, |90 + β3
o〉} or
imperfect diagonal basis {|45 + β2
o〉, | − 45 + β4
o〉} correspondingly, then Alice and Bob will share the raw key.
Similar to the security analysis based on the prefect device, A1 and B1 can not be changed by Alice and Bob in
our security analysis, it can not be changed by Eve simultaneously. However, A1 and B1 are permitted to share the
imperfection information with Alice, Bob and Eve. In the virtual protocol, the state preparation and measurement is
the same as the original practical QKD system. If the unconditional security of the virtual protocol can be proved,
security of the practical QKD system can be proved naturally. By considering Eve’s eavesdropping in the Pauli
channel, the quantum state about Alice and Bob before the measurement can be given by
∑
u,v,i,j
√
PuvQij(IA
⊗
Ii+1B1 H
i
B1
XuE1Z
v
E2
H
j
A1
I
j+1
A1
|φ1〉|u〉E1 |v〉E2 |i〉B1 |j〉A1). (9)
After the sifting step, the case of i 6= j will be discarded. We trace out Eve, A1 and B
′
1s systems, the density matrix
about Alice and Bob can be given by
ρ
′
AB =
∑
u,v
Puv(
1
2IA
⊗
IB1X
u
E1
ZvE2IA1 |φ1〉〈φ1|IA1Z
v
E2
XuE1IB1
⊗
IA+
1
2IA
⊗
HB1X
u
E1
ZvE2HA1 |φ1〉〈φ1|HA1Z
v
E2
XuE1HB1
⊗
IA).
(10)
Suppose that Alice prepare maximally entangled quantum states |φ1〉
⊗
N in her side. After the EDP protocol, Alice
and Bob will share maximally entangled quantum states |φ1〉
⊗
M , which can be illustrated as the following equation
M = N(1− h(ebit)− h(ephase)),
ebit = 〈φ2|ρ
′
AB|φ2〉+ 〈φ4|ρ
′
AB|φ4〉,
ephase = 〈φ3|ρ
′
AB|φ3〉+ 〈φ4|ρ
′
AB|φ4〉,
(11)
where ebit and ephase are the quantum bit error rate and phase error rate between Alice and Bob by considering
the EDP technology. Since the calculation of ebit and ephase are much difficulty, we will get the calculation result
based on some special imperfect parameters and the Mathematic software. Additionally, Bob will apply the imperfect
measurement with the perfect entanglement quantum state as illustrated in the imperfect measurement subsection,
Alice will apply the perfect measurement with the perfect entanglement quantum state correspondingly. Considering
the virtual protocol, the practical quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob can be estimated by
Q = 1− (1− ebit1)(1− ebit)− ebitebit1, (12)
this equation means that the practical quantum bit error rate can be divided into two cases (considering the EDP
protocol and the perfect measurement in Alice’s side and imperfect measurement in Bob’s side respectively). The first
case is considering the EDP protocol has the right bit, the measurement protocol has the error bit. The second case
is considering the EDP protocol has the error bit, the measurement has the right bit respectively. We can estimate
Eve’s information through the whole bit error rate and the phase error rate in the first step. Finally, the secret key
rate can be given by
R ≥ limN→∞
M(1−h(ebit1))
N
= (1− h(ephase)− h(ebit))(1− h(ebit1)).
(13)
the calculation of which is much complicated for the formula has too many security parameters, we will give some
examples to illustrate how to use this secret key rate formula in practical QKD system.
We give a simple example in the following, we suppose that the imperfect parameters in our security analysis are
α1 = α3 = β1 = β3 = 0, α2 = β2 =
−pi
4 , α4 = β4 =
3pi
4 . Thus, we can get HA1 = IA1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, this case means that
Alice only send the rectilinear basis {|0o〉, |90o〉}, and Bob will only measure in the rectilinear basis correspondingly.
The quantum bit error rate and phase error rate in the EDP protocol can be calculated respectively as the following
equation
ebit =
1
4 (p00 + p01 + 3p10 + 3p11),
ephase =
1
4 (p00 + 3p01 + p10 + 3p11).
(14)
7Correspondingly, upper bound of the phase error rate can be estimated by
ephase ≤ ebit +
1
2 | p10 − p01 |≤ ebit +
1
2 . (15)
Finally, we can only get zero secret key rate utilizing equation (13). In practical experimental realization, Eve can
measure Alice’s states in the same rectilinear basis with 0 bit error, and she will introduce the perfect man-in-the-
middle attack without being discovered.
CALCULATION
To compare our security analysis with GLLP’s security analysis, we will give the calculation result by considering
the case which can not be analyzed by the GLLP formula in this section. We consider that the device has individual
imperfections both in the transmitter’s side and receiver’s side respectively, which means quantum states in the same
basis maybe have the different angular deviation. Precisely, we assume that the security parameters can be satisfied
with α1 = β1 = β2 = a, α2 = α3 = α4 = β3 = β4 = 0. After some lengthy but not very interesting algebra, the bit
error rate and phase error rate in the first step (Alice and Bob establish the maximally entangled quantum pairs with
the EDP technology) can be calculated respectively as following equations,
ebit =
1
8 [cos
2(a)(p11 + p10) + sin
2(a)(p00 + p01) + cos(a)(2p10 − 2p11) + 4p01 + p10 + p11]
+ 18 [cos
2(a)(p11 + p10) + sin
2(a)(p00 + p01) + cos(a)(−2p10 + 2p11) + p10 + 5p11],
(16)
ephase =
1
8 [cos
2(a)(p00 + p01) + sin
2(a)(p10 + p11) + cos(a)(2p01 − 2p00) + 4p10 + p01 + p00]
+ 18 [cos
2(a)(p11 + p10) + sin
2(a)(p00 + p01) + cos(a)(−2p10 + 2p11) + p10 + 5p11].
(17)
Equations (16) and (17) can be directly calculated combining equation (11) with practical imperfect parameters. From
this calculation, we can find that the phase error rate is equal to the bit error rate in case of all imperfect parameters
are equal to zero.
From this calculation result, upper bound of the phase error rate can be estimated by considering the following
inequation
|ephase − ebit|
≤ 18 |[cos
2(a)(p11 + p10 − p00 − p01) + sin
2(a)(p01 + p00 − p11 − p10)
+ 2cos(a)(p10 − p11 + p00 − p01) + 3p01 − 3p10 + p11 − p00]|
= 14 |[cos
2(a)(p11 + p10 − p00 − p01) + cos(a)(p10 − p11 + p00 − p01) + 2p01 − 2p10]|
= 14 |[(cos
2(a)− 1)(p11 + p10 − p00 − p01) + (cos(a)− 1)(p10 − p11 + p00 − p01)]|
≤ 14 (1 + sin
2(a)− cos(a))
(18)
ephase ≤
1
2 (1 + sin
2(a)− cos(a)) + ebit. (19)
Utilizing equation (8), we can get the bit error rate ebit1 as the following equation
ebit1 =
1
2
sin2(a)
sin2(a)+1 . (20)
Combining equations (12), (13) with (20), we can get the final secret key rate formula as the following equation
R ≥ (1− h( Q−ebit11−2ebit1 +
1
2 (1 + sin
2(a)− cos(a)))− h( Q−ebit11−2ebit1 ))(1 − h(ebit1)), (21)
combining wit this formula, we give the simulation result of the final secret key rate by considering practical imperfect
security parameters as in Fig. 4.
Since the detection setup has the individual imperfection in our security analysis, the GLLP security analysis result
can not be applied in this case. Comparing with the perfect QKD protocol, the final secret key rate has been improved
in our calculation result, the reason for which is that Eve can not control the phase error introduced by Bob’s imperfect
measurement, and it should no be corrected by Alice and Bob correspondingly.
8FIG. 4: Final secret key rate with perfect and imperfect devices. The blue line means the perfect devices case, which can
be satisfied with equation (7). The red line means security of imperfect devices by considering parameters α1 = β1 = β2 =
0.2, α2 = α3 = α4 = β3 = β4 = 0.
CONCLUSIONS
In practical quantum key distribution realizations, the state-dependent imperfection in Alice and Bob’s side can
not be satisfied with the GLLP formula. A simple security proof of QKD with state-dependent imperfect states
preparation and measurement have been analyzed in this paper. Our security analysis result shows that the imperfect
QKD system maybe tolerate much higher quantum bit error rate comparing with the previous security analysis.
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